RISK INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE • EVIDENCE • IMPACT

GEOPOLITICAL RISK MONITORING

Strait of Hormuz Maritime Escalation

Rapid assessment of people, assets, priority risks, decision triggers, disruption exposure, and accountability.

LOCATION / AREA OF CONCERN	WHY IT MATTERS	STATUS	LAST REVIEWED
Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and the Saudi East-West (Petroline) corridor to Yanbu	The strait has been effectively closed to commercial shipping since 28 February 2026, so closure is the baseline and not the risk. In play now is the reopening: Iran has tabled seven conditions and an Iran-managed corridor, and Gulf states meet in Oman on 14 September. The question is whether a reopened corridor can be used without voiding hull cover or breaching sanctions.	Critical	13 September 2026

PEOPLE AND ASSETS EXPOSED

PERSONNEL	FACILITIES / EQUIPMENT	SUPPLY CHAIN / DATA	CUSTOMERS / COMMITMENTS
About 6,000 seafarers on roughly 400 ships unable to depart safely; crews on 418 vessels holding off berth; Petroline pump-station staff injured 10-11 Sep	VLCCs, LNG and LPG carriers; Kharg Island and Jask; Ras Tanura and Yanbu; Ras Laffan; Petroline pump stations in the Riyadh and Medina regions; ADCOP; Goreh-Jask	Crude, LNG, LPG, refined products and petrochemical feedstock; hull and cargo war-risk placements; OFAC and OFSI screening; transit-fee and payment channels	European and Asian LNG buyers under QatarEnergy force majeure into early November; refiners, insurers, charterers and financing banks

PRIORITY RISK AND BUSINESS EXPOSURE

#	RISK EVENT	WHO ABSORBS IMPACT	LIKELIHOOD	IMPACT	DISRUPTION COST	OPERATIONAL EFFECT
1	Using the Iran-managed corridor requires a transit fee or equivalent payment, voiding hull cover and creating sanctions exposure	Owners and charterers first; cargo interests, insurers and banks later	M-H	H	Severe | $1M+	LMA Strait of Hormuz Transit Fee Condition, 23 Jul 2026: insurers will not cover such a payment, and cover ceases once one has been made, financial or not, under US, UK and EU sanctions law. Iran's inbound leg runs wholly through Iranian waters under Iranian protocols (Tasnim, 12 Sep 2026).
2	Saudi East-West pipeline stays shut, removing the main non-Hormuz export route	Saudi Aramco and its term buyers first; refiners and freight markets later	M-H	H	Severe | $1M+	Drone strikes from Iraq's Maysan province, 10-11 Sep 2026, damaged pump stations in the Riyadh and Medina regions and Saudi Arabia shut the line. It had carried about 5 mb/d rerouted away from the Gulf to Yanbu. ADCOP and Goreh-Jask fall well short. No restart date announced.
3	QatarEnergy force majeure on LNG extends beyond early November	QatarEnergy and its term buyers first; European and Asian utilities later	M-H	H	Severe | $1M+	Qatar shipped 18 LNG cargoes in the first six months of the war against 509 a year earlier, about 96 percent down (Bloomberg and Euronews, 28 Aug and 8 Sep 2026, trade press). Qatari LNG has no pipeline alternative. Cancellations run into October for Pakistan.
4	A reopening is agreed but throughput recovers only partly, and slower than contracts assume	Charterers and cargo planners first; customers on fixed delivery dates later	M-H	M	High | $250K-$1M+	The 17 Jun to 17 Aug 2026 US-Iran MOU is the only recent test. Kpler measured flows rising from 2.3 mb/d before it to 6.1 mb/d during it, about 40 percent of the roughly 15 mb/d moving in 2025. It lapsed without extension, and a backlog above 400 vessels must clear first.

DECISION TRIGGERS

#	OBSERVABLE TRIGGER	THRESHOLD / SOURCE	REQUIRED ACTION
1	BREACHED 12 September 2026. Iran and Oman agreed corridor maps and Iran handed the United States seven conditions for reopening, with transit under Iranian protocols.	Tasnim and Iranian MFA, Omani Foreign Ministry, IMO and UKMTO circulars, Reuters	Live. Read the LMA Transit Fee Condition against every hull and cargo placement now, and get written insurer confirmation on whether corridor transit under Iranian protocols counts as a transit payment.
2	The 14 September Oman meeting of Iran, Iraq and Gulf states produces a signed instrument rather than a communique	Omani Foreign Ministry readout, Iranian MFA and Tasnim, IMO circulars, Reuters and Lloyd's List	Confirm before booking whether the text names fees, escorts or Iranian-flag pilotage. If it does, hold voyage approvals until OFAC and OFSI positions are obtained, and reprice landed cost.
3	Saudi Aramco confirms the East-West pipeline restarts, and states the rate against pre-strike throughput	Saudi Aramco and Ministry of Energy, Saudi Press Agency, Kpler and Vortexa loadings at Yanbu	Recalculate landed crude cost and inventory cover on the restored volume. Reset the 14- and 30-day inventory plans to the confirmed rate rather than the announced one.

ANALYST ASSESSMENT / COST BASIS / KEY GAP

Assessment: Verified facts: The strait has been effectively closed since 28 February 2026. IMO verified at least 70 attacks on shipping and 19 seafarers killed in six months, with about 6,000 seafarers on roughly 400 ships unable to depart safely (28 Aug 2026). US forces struck three Iranian tankers on 5 September and five more on 8 September. Drone strikes from Iraq's Maysan province shut the Saudi East-West pipeline on 10-11 September. On 12 September Iran and Oman agreed corridor maps and Iran gave Washington seven conditions for reopening. IMF PortWatch counted 6 transits on 6 September against a pre-crisis norm near 85 a day. Brent settled at $104.61 on 12 September. Judgment: first-order effects are the terms of passage rather than its physical availability; second-order effects are insurance validity, sanctions exposure and the cost of bypass capacity now that Petroline is down; third-order effects are LNG contract failure and inflation in importing economies.

Cost basis: Severe ($1M+) assumes 7 to 30 days of disruption for a mid-to-large shipper, importer or energy-dependent operation. High ($250K to $1M+) assumes 3 to 7 days. Included: war-risk premium, demurrage, Cape diversion, replacement cargo, fuel, inventory carrying cost and contract penalties. Assumption: the operation makes no transit fee or equivalent payment to secure passage. That assumption carries the whole range. Where a payment has been made, the exposure stops being a delay cost and becomes an uninsured hull plus a sanctions investigation, and the tier does not apply. Higher with a vessel casualty or a prolonged Petroline outage; lower if the pipeline restarts at rate and a reopening holds long enough to clear the backlog.

So what: Closure is the baseline and has been for 196 days, so a reopening headline is not the event to plan against. The event is the terms attached to it. A corridor running through Iranian waters under Iranian protocols can be physically open and commercially unusable, because the payment that buys passage ends hull cover. Firms holding written insurer and OFAC positions before the corridor opens can quote a landed cost on the day it does. The rest will seek the same confirmations from the same underwriters in the same week.

Key gap: Unresolved: whether corridor transit under Iranian protocols is a payment under the LMA clause; the fee schedule, if one exists; OFAC and OFSI positions; the Petroline restart date and rate; whether QatarEnergy force majeure runs past early November; company inventory tolerance in days; and which counterparty carries delay and diversion cost.

Sources: IMO, 28 Aug 2026. LMA, 23 Jul 2026, Transit Fee Condition, and 23 Mar 2026, war-cover availability; an interested party, and the March statement is six months old. Kpler, 19 Aug 2026, and Vortexa; commercial vendors. IMF PortWatch, latest day 6 Sep 2026. CNBC, CNN and Al Jazeera, 5-12 Sep 2026. Tasnim and Reuters, 12 Sep 2026; Tasnim is Iranian state-affiliated, and the seven conditions are unpublished. Bloomberg and Euronews, 28 Aug and 8 Sep 2026; trade press. Brent via straits. live, 12 Sep 2026; open-source tracker; Reuters, 2 Sep 2026, expanded Iranian vessel blacklist.